Florida Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 4

Article 9

June 1976

Delegation of Power: Judicial Fetters Loosened?
Lewis E. Shelley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis E. Shelley, Delegation of Power: Judicial Fetters Loosened?, 28 Fla. L. Rev. 1043 (1976).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss4/9

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Shelley: Delegation of Power: Judicial Fetters Loosened?
1976]

CASE COMMENTS

would adversely affect retail sales 71 is sufficient to justify the equation of the
72
shopping center owner's right to privacy to that of a private home owner.
The evolution of new legal concepts to meet changing social conditions
has rarely proceeded along a continuum. The principal case represents a
retreat from earlier decisions that had recognized that the spread of privately
owned community centers demanded a reassessment of traditional views on
the availability of private property for use as a forum for free expression. In
light of the instant case, the description of the modern shopping mall quoted
by Justice Powell in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner takes on an unsettling quality.
Here the shopper is isolated from the noise, fumes, confusion and
distraction which he normally fiids along city streets, and a controlled,
carefree environment is provided. .... 73
GERRY S. GIBSON

DELEGATION OF POWER: JUDICIAL FETTERS LOOSENED?
Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976)
Appellee Lee Rogers, who was doing business as American Holiday
Association,' solicited Floridians to participate in a crossword puzzle game
in which contestants paid an entry fee in return for an opportunity to win
cash prizes. 2 The Department of Legal Affairs (DLA) charged Rogers with
conducting an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of section
501.2043 of the Florida Statutes. The case bypassed an administrative propublic property. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
71. See note 69 supra.
72. See Comment, supra note 34, at 587.
73. 407 U.S. 551, 554 (1972).
1. From his principal place of business in Los Angeles, California, Lee Rogers was
engaged in conducting puzzle contests. He sent advertisements and promotional literature
through the mail and advertised in newspapers of general circulation in various states.
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae, App. A, Department of Legal
Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
2. The challenged contest was a crossword type puzzle entitling a contestant to win a
stated amount of prize money. Although initially contestants were not required to pay
money, they were encouraged to play for extra cash prizes by submitting a specified
amount of money. Payment of an entry fee of one dollar qualified the contestant for
a chance to win an additional $500 prize; payment of two dollars raised the possible
prize money to $1,000; and payment of three dollars raised the possible prize money to
$1,500. Winners were selected on scores obtained through submission of a succession
of progressively and significantly more difficult word puzzle contests. In order to proceed
from one contest to the next, contestants were required to correctly and promptly complete
all previously submitted puzzles. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257,
259-60 (Fla. 1976).
3. FtA. STAT. §501.204 (1975) provides: "(1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
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ceeding by Rogers' request for a trial on the issues. 4 The circuit court found
the statutory language to be unconstitutionally vague and the delegation of
power to the DLA beyond permissible limits.5 On direct appeal, the Florida
supreme court reversed the trial court, and HELD the key provisions of
Florida's "little FTC act" axe neither vague nor an unconstitutional delegation
6
of legislative authority.
Courts have employed the term "vague" in at least two different contexts
in constitutional litigation involving powers delegated to administrative
agencies . In one context the concern centers around the due process rights
of the individual. If the statute is so vague as to fail to give citizens fair
notice as to the proscribed activity, then due process rights are violated.8
In a second context, courts are concerned with the proper separation of
legislative and executive functions. Vague statutory direction may delegate
excessive authority to a particular administrative agency to interpret the intent
and purpose of the law while in the process of enforcing it.
declared unlawful. (2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (1)of
this section, due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of
the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(I)), as from time to time amended." This section
is the declaration of unlawful activities under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, commonly known as the state's "little FTC act." FLA. STAT. §§501.201-.213
(1975). See generally Tennyson, The Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: A New
Approach to Trade Regulation in Florida, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 223 (1974).
4. This procedure is authorized under FiA. STAT. §501.2091 (1975).
5. State v. Rogers, Case No. 74-1510 (2d Cir. Ct. Fla., May 23, 1975). Specifically,
the court ruled that §501.204 was unconstitutionally vague and that §501.205 was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. FLA. STAT. §501.205 provides: "(1) The
department shall propose rules to the cabinet which prohibit with specificity acts or
practices that violate this part and which prescribe procedural rules for the administration
of this part. Such rules shall be adopted by majority vote of the cabinet. All rules
prescribed by the cabinet and administrative actions taken by the department shall be
pursuant to chapter 120. The Department of Legal Affairs shall, at least 30 days before
the meeting at which such rules are to be considered by the cabinet, mail a copy of
such rules to any person filing a written request with the Department of Legal Affairs to
receive copies of proposed rules. The Department of Legal Affairs may charge a reasonable
rate for providing copies of such rules, which rate shall not exceed the actual cost of
printing and mailing. (2) All substantive rules and regulations promulgated under this
part shall be consistent with the rules, regulations, and decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended."
The trial judge also ruled that the puzzle game was not in violation of FLA. STAT.
§849.08 (1975), which prohibits games of chance for money or prizes. He ruled the game
was not a wagering scheme condemned by this statute but rather a contest of skill for a
prize. The court also found Rule 2-9.07, which states that it is an unfair or deceptive
trade practice for a person to engage in any kind of game of skill, contest, or other
promotion that requires an entry fee or similar consideration, to be invalid and void.
6. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1976).
7. Compare Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) with Neblett v. Carpenter,
305 U.S. 297 (1938).
8. See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (challenged as unconstitutionally
vague a federal statute making convictions of any two crimes involving moral turpitude a
ground for deportation of an alien).
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Courts concerned with the due process question consider whether the
statute is sufficiently definite to give fair notice to affected parties as to what
is required or prohibited.9 Obscenity o and vagrancy"I statutes are examples
of laws frequently subjected to this type of vagueness challenge. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
when it "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."'12 The degree of definiteness required is relative
to the subject matter of the statute-3 - criminal statutes requiring more
precision than civil statutes.' 4 Regulatory statutes governing business activities
have been allowed the greatest leeway.15 Statutes employing technical terms
are generally sustained if those expected to apply these terms can understand
their meaning.6 Furthermore, state statutes that deal with offenses difficult to
define are accorded sympathetic treatment by the Supreme Court when
not entwined with competing first amendment privileges.17
The terminology in the instant case, "unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive trade practices," has been challenged as unconstitutionally
vague on several occasions. As early as 1919 in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC,",
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Federal Trade Commission Act 9 against a vagueness challenge, concluding that the term "unfair
methods of competition" was no more vague than other legal terms accorded
wide deference such as "due process of law."20 State courts in Washington 2'
and Wisconsin 22 have upheld similar phrases utilized in the consumer protection acts of those states.
9. See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
10. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 US. 507 (1948); State v. Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d
391 (Fla. 1974).
11. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
12. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (held unconstitutionally
vague an Oklahoma minimum wage statute requiring government contractors to pay a
per diem wage rate not less than the current rate in the locality).
13. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
14. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 US. 183 (1936).
16. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
17. 333 US. at 517.
18. 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919) (considering a complaint by the FTC against Sears
in its mail order business, the court discussed the charge that the FTC Act was unconstitutionally vague).
19. 14 U.S.C. §45 (1970).

20. 258 F. at 314. The question of the vagueness of "unfair practices" proscribed in §5
of the FTC Act has not been before the Supreme Court; however, the Court has
acknowledged that the terms are not capable of precise definition. FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643 (1931).
21. Washington v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
22. Carpets by the Carload v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D.Wis. 1973).
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Unlike the due process vagueness question, which centers on individual
rights, the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative power was historically a
corollary to the separation of powers principle. 23 At the federal level nondelegation never existed except in theory, 24 and only twice in American
history has congressional delegation of power to public agencies been held
invalid. 25 On the other hand, state courts have consistently given more
deference to the nondelegation doctrine, and the doctrine still survives in
20
some form in most state courts.

In 1908 the Florida supreme court rendered an exhaustive opinion on the
2
issue of delegation of legislative power in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Arising out of a suit to exact penalties for violation of a railroad commission
rule, the case focused on the constitutionality of the broad powers conferred
on the railroad commission by the legislature. Although the court recognized
that the legislature may not delegate its powers, it circumvented the nondelegation doctrine by holding that the legislature may enact a law, which is complete in itself and is designed to accomplish a general public purpose, by
authorizing designated officials within definite limitations to provide rules
and regulations for the operation of the statute. 28 A valid delegation of
power takes place when the legislature has the power to enact the statute,
when the statute is complete, and when the limits of the delegated power are
fixed in the statute. 29 Limiting parameters should include standards to guide
the agency's action, a designation of the public purposes to be served, and
the grounds on which the agency could initiate action. 0
The distinction between a valid and an invalid delegation has not always
been clearly discernible.31 For example, in Campoamor v. State Live Stock
23. See generally Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, 29 YALE L.J. 369 (1920);
Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Ciu. L. RE%.
385 (1935).
24. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 26-36 (3d ed. 1972).
25. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
26. K. DAVIS, supra note 24, at 36-41.
27. 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
28. Id. at 619, 47 So. at 971. This language has led one commentator to state that:
"Stripped of its eloquence and reduced to a single statement, the opinion merely states
that the legislature may not delegate legislative power, but may authorize administrative
agencies to act legislatively. This distinction is a nebulous one, if indeed a distinction
exists at all. It would appear that the prohibition against delegation is but a legal
fiction arising from the separation doctrine, for the functions allowed the agency are the
same as those permitted where such a fiction is not maintained." Fuguay, Separation of
Powers in Florida, in PAPERS ON FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 51-52 (E. Bartley ed. 1952).
29. 56 Fla. at 624, 47 So. at 976.
30. Id.
31. The Florida supreme court has upheld a statute allowing a licensing board to
issue certificates only to persons who were sober, law abiding, and of good character.
State ex rel. Hubbard v. Holmes, 53 Fla. 226, 44 So. 179 (1907). In another case the
Commissioner of Agriculture has been given authority to promulgate standards for the
distribution of eggs that in his judgment would promote honest and fair dealing in the
interests of the consumer. Mayo v. Bossenbury, 152 Fla. 16, 10 So. 2d 725 (1942). However,
a statute that directed the Comptroller to consider the adequacy of existing facilities and
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Sanitary Board,3 2 the statute at issue permitted the board to "take such
measures as in the judgment of [the] Board may be necessary and proper to
control infectious cattle diseases."3 3 The Florida supreme court held that
this was a proper delegation of legislative authority.ss In contrast, Robbins v.
Webb's Cut Rate Drug Store 5 involved a statute that empowered the Barbers'
Sanitary Commission to provide rules to prevent "unfair and unreasonable
economic practices among barbers or barber shops."3 6 Finding the statutory
language to be an inadequate standard, the Robbins court concluded that
37
the terms were so vague as to give the commission unbridled discretion.
Similarly, in Connor v. Joe Hatton, Inc.,3 8 a constitutional question was
raised over a provision in the Celery and Sweet Corn Marketing Act that
allowed the commissioner of agriculture to develop regulations for the "re'0
moval of trade barriers" and "the prohibition of unfair trade practices."
The Connor court concluded that the phrases were so vague and lacking
in definite meaning in law or common usage40 as to vest the commissioner
with unlimited discretion to define the terms.
The approach of the Florida supreme court to delegation of legislative
power has been to focus generally on the adequacy of the standards; however,
the court has usually failed to examine the legislative purpose in defining
the particular delegation in broad or specific terms. The court has also
41
given little consideration to the safeguards against arbitrariness. Judicial
decisions have focused only minimal attention on the agency rule or regulation that was promulgated under the authority of the legislative enactment.
Once the adequacy of the standard is determined, the regulation is accordingly
42
held valid or invalid.
3
An exception to this approach is State v. Griffin. Although the focus
was still on the adequacy of the standard, the court did examine the public

the need of the area to be served before issuing permits for new cemeteries was held
invalid. Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969). In 1944 a statute that required the
business manager of labor organizations to obtain a license if a state board was of the
opinion that the public interest so required was held to be too broad. Hill v. State
ex rel. Watson, 155 Fla. 245, 19 So. 2d 857 (1944), rev'd on other grounds,, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). Another case in 1962 declared invalid a statute that allowed a commission to
impose restrictions on the transfer of licenses if this would serve the public interest. Delta
Truck Brokers v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1962).
32. 136 Fla. 451, 182 So. 277 (1938).
33. Id. at 453, 182 So. at 279.
34. Id.
35. 153 Ea. 822, 16 So. 2d 121 (1943).
36. Id. at 824, 16 So. 2d at 123.
37. Id.
38. 216 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1968).
39. Id. at 210.
40. Id. at 213.
41. See note 31 supra. But cf. Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So. 2d 867 (lst
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
42. See cases cited in notes 31, 32, 35, & 38 supra.
43. 239 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970).
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purpose to be accomplished by the statute. 44 The court recognized that some
problems require a more general approach to legislation and that judicial
scrutiny ought to be accompanied by recognition and appreciation of the
need for flexibility. 45 Griffin illustrates a new approach to the delegation
doctrine that accommodates greater grants of administrative power. Five
years later, the supreme court in the instant case again faced the delegation
issue.
In the instant case the due process vagueness issue was analyzed with
almost complete reliance on the Supreme Court of Washington's reasoning
in Washington v. Reader's Digest Association,4 6 a case that considered the
same allegedly vague terminology4 7 Citing United States Supreme Court
precedents,4" the Washington court noted three propositions: vagueness and
fair notice are relative concepts that depend on the subject matter of the
statute; criminal statutes and statutes limiting first amendment freedoms
require a greater degree of definiteness to satisfy due process requirements;
and business regulatory statutes and those dealing with offenses difficult to
define are to be treated sympathetically." Both the Washington and the
Florida statutes specified that the three decades of decisions by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts interpreting the FTC Act
should be used as interpretive guides to give meaning to the terms "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices." 0 Considering the statute in light of these factors, the Florida supreme court
determined that the language under attack was sufficiently definite to give
an individual fair warning of the activity proscribed. Therefore, the statute
was upheld since it was not so vague as to deny an individual due process. 51
The instant court next considered the issue of whether the "little FTC
act" constituted an improper attempt to delegate legislative power to the
executive branch, focusing on the question of whether there were adequate
standards to guide the rulemaking and enforcing authority. Initially, the
court adopted the appellant's position that the word "shall" in section
501.205(2) should be construed as a mandatory requirement that the rulemaking authority be in compliance with federal trade law standards in
effect on or before the effective date of the law. 52 Given this construction,
44. Id. at 581.
45. Id.
46. 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
47. WASH. REV. CODE §19.36.020 (1961). Both statutes were derived from the Model
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. See Brief for Appellant at 9-12,
Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
48. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). See text accompanying
notes 9-15 supra.
49. 329 So. 2d at 264 (quoting 81 Wash. 2d at 268-71, 501 P.2d at 299-302). Florida's
"little FTC act" is in essence a civil statute that carries no civil or monetary penalties
until violation of a consent or cease and desist order.
50. WASH. REv. CODE §19.86.020 (1961); FLA. STAT. §501.204(2) (1975).
51. 329 So. 2d at 265.
52. Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 22-23, Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers,
329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
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the court concluded that adequate standards had been announced to provide
53
specific guidance to the administrative agency.
In reaching its conclusion, the court went beyond an adequacy of the
standards approach. The court quoted at length from its earlier opinion
in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,5" selecting language that emphasized
the need to look at the public purpose to be accomplished when determining
the adequacy of those standards 55 Emphasizing that on certain subjects the
legislature could only codify a general policy,56 the court reiterated its duty
to sustain the legislative will when it is not clearly and plainly unconstitu7
tional.
In a concurring opinion Justice England reached the same results as
the majority on the issues of vagueness and delegation of legislative power
but emphasized different factors. 58 On the vagueness issue he pointed out
that the legislature had previously attempted to prohibit specific market
place activities, and the result had been unsuccessful. 59 Therefore, he viewed
the "little FTC act" as a corrective law that the court should be reluctant to
invalidate since the original approach to the problem was unsuccessful.
Justice England also noted that the terms used in section 501.204(1) have a
more definite meaning to those individuals in the marketplace, whose conduct
the act seeks to govern, than to citizens and individuals in general.
Significantly, he interpreted the majority opinion as not restricting the reach
of the act solely to unfair and deceptive trade practices as defined by federal
60
courts and the FTC on the date that the Florida law became effective.
In analyzing the standards the supreme court applied to both the vagueness and delegation issues, a comparison with the trial court's opinion is
helpful. On both issues. the lower court 6 ' looked at the language of the
statute standing alone and ignored the FTC and federal court decisions,
which were not deemed to be controlling under the statute. 2 From the face
of the statute, the trial judge concluded that a person could not state with
certainty what would be a violation of the law; therefore, he held that the
law was unconstitutionally vague. 63 Applying the same standard, he found
that the statute was vague, indefinite, and lacked adequate guidelines to
properly limit the rulemaking power of the DLA. Thus, in the lower court's
53. 329 So. 2d at 265.
54. 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
55. See text accompanying notes 30 &44 supra.
56. State v. Griffin, 239. So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1970).
57. 329 So. 2d at 266.
58. Id. at 268. Justice England, as the consumer advisor to the Governor of Florida,
received a federal grant to conduct a survey of consumer market problems in Florida in
1972. The results of his survey were submitted in CONSUMER AFFAMrs IN.FLORIDA: A REPORT
To GOVERNOR REUBEN O'D. AsKEW (1973). As a result of the recommendations in this
report, legislation was drafted that eventually became Florida's "little FTC act." See
Brief for Appellant at 4-7, Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976).
59. 329 So. 2d at 268.
""
60. Id. at 269.
61. State v. Rogers, Case No. 74-1510 (2d Cir. Ct. Fla., May 23, 1975).
62. Id. at 6.

63. Id. at 7.
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view, this was an invalid delegation of legislative power. 64 No distinction
was drawn in regard to the type of statute involved or the purpose to be
accomplished. Furthermore, although unarticulated in the lower court's
opinion, the viewpoint of men of common intelligence was the vagueness
standard utilized for both issues.65
Significantly, the instant court adopted a different approach and
distinguished the standard to be used on the delegation and due process
issues. Since the vagueness issue involves the due process rights of the
individual, the type of statute and the penalties involved are factors directly
considered. 6 Moreover, the perspective of the businessman in the marketplace
rather than the average individual was used as the measuring standard.6 7 As
to the delegation issue, the subject matter of the statute and the viability
of alternative approaches were weighed.6 8 In addition, the adequacy of the
legislative standard was determined in light of the purpose to be served
by the statute.
Although the supreme court took a more liberal approach, federal courts
and some state courts have moved even further in upholding statutes against
constitutional attacks.6 9 On the vagueness issue, these courts have been concerned with actions taken. by the courts and the agency after enactment of
the statute that serve to make uncertain terms more definite.70 On the delegation issue, they have ceased to focus on the adequacy of the standard and
look instead at the use of the power by the agency. 7' Thus, the courts have
2
considered whether the agency utilized fair procedures in its decision making.
In the instant case, the court did not include the more specific administrative rule as a factor in the notice requirement. 73 In fact, the opinion contains
no analysis of the rule or whether the rule falls within the FTC's interpretation of an unfair trade practice.7 4 Also, scant attention was given to the
statutory procedures by which DLA rules are promulgated. This is significant
64.
65.

Id.
Id.

66. 329 So. 2d at 264.
67. Although the majority opinion does not state whether a standard of the average
man or of the businessman of the marketplace is to be used when applying the vagueness
test, the opinions emphasized that 30 years of federal court and FTC decisions gaie
more definiteness to the terminology. 329 So. 2d at 264-65. The opinion also quoted from
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), which indicated that statutes with special
terms were to be construed in light of those expected to use them. Justice England stated
explicitly that the perspective of the businessman was the test of the vagueness issue. 329
So. 2d at 268.
68. 329 So. 2d at 266.
69. See K. DAVIS, supra note 24, at 40-43.
70. Id. at 43-52.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. This point is not mentioned either in the Brief for the Appellant or in the
Brief for the Appellee.
74. In a brief discussion upholding the rules, the court stated: "Finally, we determine
that Administrative Rule 2-9.07, Florida Administrative Code, promulgated under the
authority of Sections 501.204 and 501.205, Florida Statutes, is a valid and reasonable rule."
329 So. 2d at 267.
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in that one purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to prevent an arbitrary
exercise of power by the agency. 75 The statute at issue actually provides an
abundance of safeguards since rules promulgated must meet the requirements of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act 6 and must in addition be
7
approved by the cabinet.
Under section 501.205(1) over 60 specific types of unfair or deceptive
trade practices have been identified by the DLA.78 A person charged with
violating one of these rules can no longer claim constitutional defenses based
on vagueness and delegation of legislative power. However, a rule will always
be subject to challenge for failure to follow the provisions of the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act.79
Each rule adopted is also open to the argument that it is inconsistent
with federal trade law as of October 1973 since the instant court approved
the appellant's argument that each rule must comply with the federal standards
utilized before the effective date of the statute. 0 Whether a particular rule
meets this latter requirement is likely to be a source of much future litigation.
Moreover, the latter requirement is complicated further by the apparent
contradiction that exists between the majority's opinion and Justice England's
interpretation of the majority's view.8' Although the majority appeared to
limit the agency's rulemaking power to the existing federal trade law precedent
at the time of the enactment of the statute, 82 Justice England stated that
the court's opinion permitted the agency to utilize future federal trade law
as state policy dictated.8 3 If the majority's restriction is accepted, the purposes
75. See generally K. DAvis, supra note 24, at 26-43. See, e.g., Delta Truck Brokers v.
King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1962); Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So. 2d 867
(ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
76. FLA. STAT. §120 (1975) contains requirements such as notice and publication before
adoption of a rule, mandatory public hearings on proposed rules, a standing committee of
state legislators to supervise agency rulemaking, independent hearing examiners when an
individual is charged with violating a rule, and provisions for declaratory rulings by
agencies. See generally Note, Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the FloridaAdministrative
Procedure Act, 27 U. FLA. L. Rav. 755 (1975).
77. FLA. STAT. §501.205(1) (1975). This is a separate requirement in addition to the
requirements of chapter 120.
78. See, e.g., 1 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 2-20.02.
79. See note 76 supra.
80. 329 So. 2d at 265.
81. 329 So. 2d at 267, 269. For an analysis of the instant case that rationalizes this
contradiction, see Tennyson, Florida Little FTC Act: New Consumer Rights in the
Marketplace,50 FLA. B.J. 375 (1976).
82. "Another aspect of the issue of delegation of legislative authority concerns the
question of whether the legislature by the subject act intended to incorporate future
(subsequent to the effective date of the statute) decisions of the Federal Trade Commission
and federal court decisions. To preserve the constitutional validity of the act, we would
have to say that the legislative enactment intended only decisions made prior to its
enactment." 329 So. 2d at 267.
83. "I agree with the majority that it is not necessary to restrict the act, as appellant
suggests, solely to unfair and deceptive trade practices as defined by the courts and the
Federal Trade Commission on the date our law became effective." Id. at 269. Justice
England's approach allows the rulemaking authority more flexibility and would prevent
a potentially incongruous result if a post-1973 FTC decision invalidated a pre-1973 decision.
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